Last Sunday night I got the sort of text message that everyone one in this business dreads. "Incident in Kabul. One of ours down. Details to follow."
A message like that sets off several hours of frantic activity trying to trace the course of events, determine the casualties and sort out the next step. The Ops Manager, the Duty Officer, myself and the Deputy President all traded calls and texts for the next two hours until we pieced together the story.
A kidnap attempt of a local national in Kabul had resulted in one of our guys being shot, and his protectee snatched by four men in a dark SUV. The puzzling thing was that the name of the protectee was not on our list of clients. WTF? What was our PSD doing with a high-risk target when we didn't even have a contract or an agreement to provide the service? And what exactly is the fallout when someone you are protecting is snatched when you weren't supposed to be protecting him in the first place?
Turns out that one of actual clients, the president of an Afghan construction company, had contracted with us for static security at his office and a PSD team to cover his movements. Nothing unusual there. Where it gets strange is that this client had decided that his brother, the president of another separate Afghan construction company, ought to have protection as well. Rather than recommend that he contact us and write a proper contract, he simply phoned The Rug Merchant and asked if his brother could "borrow" one of our CPOs from time to time.*
*CPO= Close Protection Officer, i.e. a bodyguard; PSD= Personal Security Detail, i.e. a team of bodyguards.
Now the obvious answer to a request like this is "Uhhhhh........no."
Upon reflection, one might say, "Hell no."
But, The Rug Merchant, renowned across two continents for his limited mental capacity, said, "Sure, why not?" And then didn't bother to inform Operations, or anyone else in the chain of command. Just one Afghan doing a favor for another, no reason to make it formal.
The problem arises because a PSD team is calibrated and staffed to account for the anticipated threat and the likely movements of the client. Most importantly, there's more than one guy on a typcial PSD team, both to provide backup and to allow for downtime. In this case, the client's PSD team consisted of three guards, two of whom were with the client whenever he moved outside his office or residence.
Last Sunday, the client decided to stay at home and give two of the CPOs the night off. The third he loaned out to his brother for the night, failing to consider that one CPO is rarely sufficient if there's trouble. And, as I said, he had verbal approval for this from The Rug Merchant himself.*
*It's not the client's job to understand the risks and tactical situation. Our job is to protect them and tell them when they're being stupid. A task that The Rug Merchant failed at spectacularly.
So, the client's brother (whom I suspect is a deeply nefarious character with lots of enemies) goes off for a night on the town. His only protection is a CPO who has been loaned out without notice on his night off, has never met the protectee or his driver before, and has no idea of the destination or the schedule. Pretty much a recipe for disaster.
Plan for disaster, you generally get disaster. On a side street in Sherpur, their car was blocked by a pair of SUVs and four armed men rapidly surrounded the car. One of them smashed the passenger-side window and stuck the barrel of an AK-47 in my guy's face. Unable to bring his own weapon to bear, the CPO simply grabbed the barrel and pushed it down, trying to get the muzzle away from his face.
Generally, kidnap of locals in Kabul is a non-violent affair. The gangs who pull it off are usually experienced criminals and the last thing they want is shots fired in the middle of the night. They're also not used to being resisted and they certainly don't like it when someone grabs their weapon. In this case, I suspect that the kidnapper simply panicked, surprised that anyone would dare to argue with him. Unfortunately, his Kalashnikov was set to full-auto and in his surprise and anger he squeezed the trigger and put a burst into our CPO at a range of about ten inches.
Because the CPO had pushed the muzzle downward away from his face, he took five rounds between the chest and the knees. Needless to say, he stopped resisting at that point (as one does with five bullets embedded in your soft tissue) and the kidnappers bustled the protectee into one of their vehicles and tore out of there before the cops could arrive.
Despite several faults, the AK-47 is an effective weapon. The 7.62 x 39mm round is a powerful one (roughly equivalent to .30 caliber) and usually one is enough to put someone down, two is almost always fatal. Taking five, at point blank range, into the chest, stomach and upper thighs, is an invitation to Allah. Amazingly, not only did the CPO survive, but the doctors at the local hospital tell us that he'll make a full recovery. I've come close to death from a particularly bad hangover, and this guys gets punctured through his vitals by five bullets traveling over 2000 feet per second, and he's going to be fine, albeit after a long recovery. I'm told that his name in English means "strong" or "powerful" and now I don't doubt that it's appropriate.
Now we're stuck with the fallout, including a lot of uncomfortable questions from the Ministry of Interior as to why were providing an armed escort to someone without a contract. As to the fate of the "protectee," I confess that I don't much care. He's not one of my clients, he's obviously a moron and he nearly got one of my people killed. His family will probably pay the ransom, but they better not come to me for donations.
Showing posts with label Afghan Law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghan Law. Show all posts
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Monday, August 2, 2010
Taliban Justice
Note: The links below connect to a disturbing story, and an even more shocking photograph. Not for the faint-hearted or the squeamish.
A while back, I asked to be reminded of what we're doing here. Ultimately, is the cost of so many allied and Afghan lives, not to mention the financial burdens, worth it for what we may accomplish here. I still don't have an answer to that, at least not one that I find satisfying. My own opinion changes from day to day.
Time Magazine has a cover story about one Afghan girl's experience with Taliban justice. Time even used a photo of the girl on the cover of their latest issue. Needless to say, both are disturbing. The other day, in a post about WikiLeaks, I mentioned the Taliban's concept of "justice." That concept is on display in the Time story.
I won't editorialize the story here, except to say that it is A) one individual's story and should be read as such, and B) it certainly highlights one of the things that is fundamentally wrong with this place. To all who claim that we should reduce our presence here to simply hunting Al Qaeda with drones and let the Afghans sort out the rest for themselves, try going to Aisha's house and tell her that Afghanistan will be a better place under the Taliban. Somehow, I don't think she would agree.
A while back, I asked to be reminded of what we're doing here. Ultimately, is the cost of so many allied and Afghan lives, not to mention the financial burdens, worth it for what we may accomplish here. I still don't have an answer to that, at least not one that I find satisfying. My own opinion changes from day to day.
Time Magazine has a cover story about one Afghan girl's experience with Taliban justice. Time even used a photo of the girl on the cover of their latest issue. Needless to say, both are disturbing. The other day, in a post about WikiLeaks, I mentioned the Taliban's concept of "justice." That concept is on display in the Time story.
I won't editorialize the story here, except to say that it is A) one individual's story and should be read as such, and B) it certainly highlights one of the things that is fundamentally wrong with this place. To all who claim that we should reduce our presence here to simply hunting Al Qaeda with drones and let the Afghans sort out the rest for themselves, try going to Aisha's house and tell her that Afghanistan will be a better place under the Taliban. Somehow, I don't think she would agree.
Thursday, July 8, 2010
Even Capone Had a Lawyer
Disgraced journalist* Gerald Posner, who was a lawyer in a previous incarnation, has now decided to return to his professional roots by taking on a few new clients.
*Is the term "disgraced journalist" at risk of becoming redundant, like "slimy lawyer" or "corrupt politician?"
Apparently, he's decided that the way to reenter the legal profession is to seek out the most oppressed, maligned and downtrodden people he can find, and then write laughably stupid letters to the editor on their behalf. So, he trolls the world for suitably aggreived clients and settles on..................the Karzais? WTF?
Specifically, Posner, in a letter posted on the WSJ online, objects to the WSJ's earlier characterization of Mahmood Karzai (younger brother to Hamid) as a money-launderer and smuggler. Mahmood was one of two Afghans personally named in the recent report (although of course he's hardly the only one suspected of moving large sums of cash to Dubai).
After conducting his own interview with his new client, Posner concludes:
Is he seriously claiming that Mahmood Karzai is "the only Afghan businessman" investing money into the country? That's beyond stupid; it's insultingly stupid. Even my moronic boss, The Rug Merchant, no angel himself, has invested millions of US dollars into Afghanistan, and facilitated the investment of millions more.
*And those real estate deals and the cement plant? Hardly examples of free enterprise at work. There's only one cement plant in Kandahar because Ahmed Wali Karzai, the President's other brother (the really naughty one) only allows one cement plant in Kandahar, so he can charge what he likes to construction companies. Monopolistic extortion. The real estate deals are based on the Afghan conception of emminent domain, basically "I have more guns than you, so get the hell off your land and give it to me so I can rent it to foreigners, OK?"
According to Charles Homans at Foreign Policy, Posner is representing other members of the Karzai clan as well, including older brother Qayum and the aforementioned Ahmed Wali. Posner is quoted as saying, "They're really proud of the reputations they have earned." That statement is so bizarre I can't even begin to ridicule it.*
*Although I suspect that Ahmed Wali Karzai truly is proud of his reputation as the "King of Kandahar." It's just that he's so far gone as to actually believe that he is a virtuous and magnamimous emir, rather than a brutal thug and petty tyrant.
On the upside, I don't think anyone can accuse Posner of plagarizing this stuff, since no one else would ever consider writing it.
*Is the term "disgraced journalist" at risk of becoming redundant, like "slimy lawyer" or "corrupt politician?"
Apparently, he's decided that the way to reenter the legal profession is to seek out the most oppressed, maligned and downtrodden people he can find, and then write laughably stupid letters to the editor on their behalf. So, he trolls the world for suitably aggreived clients and settles on..................the Karzais? WTF?
Specifically, Posner, in a letter posted on the WSJ online, objects to the WSJ's earlier characterization of Mahmood Karzai (younger brother to Hamid) as a money-launderer and smuggler. Mahmood was one of two Afghans personally named in the recent report (although of course he's hardly the only one suspected of moving large sums of cash to Dubai).
After conducting his own interview with his new client, Posner concludes:
Mr. Karzai has never transferred large amounts of cash out of the country. He is willing to take a lie-detector test on this matter. This unproven and false accusation hurts him since he is the only Afghan businessman I'm aware of who is investing his money into the country—in large real-estate projects in Kandahar and the nation's infrastructure, such as its only cement plant*— rather than taking money out as many others have done. No Afghan businessman or politician or public figure is more transparent than Mahmood Karzai.
Is he seriously claiming that Mahmood Karzai is "the only Afghan businessman" investing money into the country? That's beyond stupid; it's insultingly stupid. Even my moronic boss, The Rug Merchant, no angel himself, has invested millions of US dollars into Afghanistan, and facilitated the investment of millions more.
*And those real estate deals and the cement plant? Hardly examples of free enterprise at work. There's only one cement plant in Kandahar because Ahmed Wali Karzai, the President's other brother (the really naughty one) only allows one cement plant in Kandahar, so he can charge what he likes to construction companies. Monopolistic extortion. The real estate deals are based on the Afghan conception of emminent domain, basically "I have more guns than you, so get the hell off your land and give it to me so I can rent it to foreigners, OK?"
According to Charles Homans at Foreign Policy, Posner is representing other members of the Karzai clan as well, including older brother Qayum and the aforementioned Ahmed Wali. Posner is quoted as saying, "They're really proud of the reputations they have earned." That statement is so bizarre I can't even begin to ridicule it.*
*Although I suspect that Ahmed Wali Karzai truly is proud of his reputation as the "King of Kandahar." It's just that he's so far gone as to actually believe that he is a virtuous and magnamimous emir, rather than a brutal thug and petty tyrant.
On the upside, I don't think anyone can accuse Posner of plagarizing this stuff, since no one else would ever consider writing it.
Sunday, July 4, 2010
Bill Shaw, Free and Clear
Well, a while back I promised a post on Bill Shaw, the ArmorGroup country manager who was convicted of bribery in Afghanistan and jailed for two years in Kabul's notorious Pul-i-Charki prison.
I had planned to discuss the definition of "bribery" as it applied to this case, as well as the rather obvious double standard at work in Afghan justice.
Alas, my procrastination has made all of that somewhat irrelevant. The BBC is reporting that Shaw will be released in the next few days and repatriated to the UK as soon as practicable. The official reason is that an appeals court found a "lack of evidence" to sustain the conviction. A secondary reason is the probable behind the scenes pressure from the British embassy that got him sprung early.
In the end, the Karzai administration made their point that it's not only Afghans who are involved in corruption here.* PSC employees are put on notice that the government is keeping a close eye on them, and government functionaries are now terrified of the omnipresent anti-corruption police.
*The are certainly the bulk of it, but Westerners are hardly as clean and pure as they sometimes claim.
I'm hesitant to call what Shaw did "bribery" but there really isn't a better word for it. He claims that he was told the $20,000 USD he paid to the Customs Department was fine for improper licensing. I don't doubt that's what he was told, but I am highly skeptical of his claim of ignorance. He knew perfectly well that it was an off-the-books "service fee." We've all done it, myself included.* I suspect that, if a proper accounting could be made, one would find that millions of unaccounted dollars have changed hands simply to navigate the difficult maze of licensing B6 armored vehicles. Bill simply had the bad luck to be made the poster-child for Karzai's attempt to deflect criticism from his own shortcomings.
*Don't ask what happened to the brown envelope full of cash that was in my safe until a few days ago. It was a "service fee."
Either way, I'm glad he's out. Pul-i-Charki is a hellhole on par with Black Beach Prison in Equitorial Guinea. Most who go in for any length of time are never heard from again. I doubt that even a man reportedly as tough as Bill Shaw could have survived two years in there.
As a side note, despite the "lack of evidence" found by the appeals court, the conviction of Shaw's interpreter and bodyguard was upheld and he's facing another eight months inside. I hope that ArmorGroup won't forget that one of their employees is still in peril. How we treat our local nationals is a good indication of the true nature of a private-security company. ArmorGroup still has an outstanding debt to be paid to Maiwand Limar. Assuming he lives long enough to collect.
I had planned to discuss the definition of "bribery" as it applied to this case, as well as the rather obvious double standard at work in Afghan justice.
Alas, my procrastination has made all of that somewhat irrelevant. The BBC is reporting that Shaw will be released in the next few days and repatriated to the UK as soon as practicable. The official reason is that an appeals court found a "lack of evidence" to sustain the conviction. A secondary reason is the probable behind the scenes pressure from the British embassy that got him sprung early.
In the end, the Karzai administration made their point that it's not only Afghans who are involved in corruption here.* PSC employees are put on notice that the government is keeping a close eye on them, and government functionaries are now terrified of the omnipresent anti-corruption police.
*The are certainly the bulk of it, but Westerners are hardly as clean and pure as they sometimes claim.
I'm hesitant to call what Shaw did "bribery" but there really isn't a better word for it. He claims that he was told the $20,000 USD he paid to the Customs Department was fine for improper licensing. I don't doubt that's what he was told, but I am highly skeptical of his claim of ignorance. He knew perfectly well that it was an off-the-books "service fee." We've all done it, myself included.* I suspect that, if a proper accounting could be made, one would find that millions of unaccounted dollars have changed hands simply to navigate the difficult maze of licensing B6 armored vehicles. Bill simply had the bad luck to be made the poster-child for Karzai's attempt to deflect criticism from his own shortcomings.
*Don't ask what happened to the brown envelope full of cash that was in my safe until a few days ago. It was a "service fee."
Either way, I'm glad he's out. Pul-i-Charki is a hellhole on par with Black Beach Prison in Equitorial Guinea. Most who go in for any length of time are never heard from again. I doubt that even a man reportedly as tough as Bill Shaw could have survived two years in there.
As a side note, despite the "lack of evidence" found by the appeals court, the conviction of Shaw's interpreter and bodyguard was upheld and he's facing another eight months inside. I hope that ArmorGroup won't forget that one of their employees is still in peril. How we treat our local nationals is a good indication of the true nature of a private-security company. ArmorGroup still has an outstanding debt to be paid to Maiwand Limar. Assuming he lives long enough to collect.
Tuesday, June 29, 2010
What We're Fighting For
On most days, I have trouble seeing the good side to this place. Very occasionally, I find some small bit of encouragement in the people here. And all too often, I'm reminded of what a primitive, atavistic culture this is.
Someone remind me again of why we're here.
Someone remind me again of why we're here.
Thursday, June 10, 2010
Defenestrations
Big news out of the Presidential Palace a couple of days ago.
As a consequence of the attack last week on the "peace jirga" here in Kabul, both the Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar and the chief of the National Directorate of Security Amrullah Saleh have been forced from their posts. Official reports say that after several hours of discussion with President Karzai, during which they were unable to offer "satisfactory" explanations about the failure to stop the attack, both men submitted their resignations which were immediately accepted.*
*That's the official line, but it's more likely that the resignations were a result of both men's refusal to accept Karzai's proposal to release several thousand Taliban prisoners as a gesture of goodwill. MoI troops and the NDS spent the last couple of years rounding these guys up (and suffered a lot of casualties in the process), and now Karzai wants to let them go because he feels like he needs more friends. No wonder they up and quit.
The official line probably understates the acrimony of the "discussions." First, I doubt that there was a lot of actual back-and-forth discussion. Tensions have been running high in the upper ranks of the Karzai administration for some time, and I suspect that Karzai did a lot of shouting while Atmar and Saleh sat there stone-faced. Second, if either of them did get an opportunity to actually present their case, it's likely that questions were raised about the comprimising of the Afghan security apparatus by Karzai's friends and relatives.
Too early to estimate the full fallout from the resignations, but it's safe to say that it won't be good. At precisely the moment when ISAF needs a set credible partners in the ANSF to properly launch the summer offensive, two key ministries have lost their experienced chiefs. Despite some serious flaws with the ANP, Atmar was well respected by both the British and Americans and had a reasonably effective working relationship with his ISAF and U.S. Army counterparts.
By most accounts (including my own estimation), Saleh was one of few truly excellent leaders in the Karzai government. Due to the nature of his job (NDS is basically the secret police, essentially a combination of the CIA and FBI), Saleh kept a lower profile than most in the government, but his organization had become quite effective at rooting out cells of bad guys around the country. It's said that even if they couldn't do anything about it, NDS knew the details on the nefarious dealings of everyone, including those within the government itself.*
*Such knowledge was probably a contributing factor to Saleh's ouster. Even the much-feared NDS was prevented from operating effectively down in Kandahar by the interference of Ahmed Wali Karzai and other scumbags close to the President. Nevertheless, Saleh almost certainly knows where the bodies are buried (literally). If Karzai was smart, he would have kept Saleh in the government just to keep him quiet.
Saleh is an ethnic Tajik, and perhaps more importantly a Panjshiri Tajik and old comrade of Ahmed Shah, the most famous and most effective mujiheddin of the Soviet days. That made him unpopular in a government dominated by Pashtuns, but he was well liked by the various Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies. His relationship with the CIA goes back to the days of the Soviet occupation and it's said that he still maintains close ties with Langley.
Both men have been replaced by their deputies, people closer to the Karzai clan and presumably loyal to Karzai personally. General Munir Mangal, the former Deputy Interior Minister, has been promoted, and Ibrahim Spinzada is the new head of NDS. Both of these appointments are desribed as "temporary" but the Karzai administration is probably not going to expend a lot of effort looking for permanent solutions.
Spinzada is Karzai's brother-in-law and the Mangal clan has been loyal to Karzai for a long time. Looks like the President is using the attack on the jirga to consolidate his control over the security apparatus and remove a couple of more independently-minded rivals.
Not exactly what this country needs heading into the fighting season, and with the Taliban becoming more active every day.
President Hamid Karzai forced two of his top three security officials to resign Sunday over their failure to prevent attacks on last week’s peace council in the capital, Afghan and American officials said, creating shock and concern among Western
officials about such serious changes in crucial ministries even as the American war effort here reaches a critical phase.
As a consequence of the attack last week on the "peace jirga" here in Kabul, both the Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar and the chief of the National Directorate of Security Amrullah Saleh have been forced from their posts. Official reports say that after several hours of discussion with President Karzai, during which they were unable to offer "satisfactory" explanations about the failure to stop the attack, both men submitted their resignations which were immediately accepted.*
*That's the official line, but it's more likely that the resignations were a result of both men's refusal to accept Karzai's proposal to release several thousand Taliban prisoners as a gesture of goodwill. MoI troops and the NDS spent the last couple of years rounding these guys up (and suffered a lot of casualties in the process), and now Karzai wants to let them go because he feels like he needs more friends. No wonder they up and quit.
The official line probably understates the acrimony of the "discussions." First, I doubt that there was a lot of actual back-and-forth discussion. Tensions have been running high in the upper ranks of the Karzai administration for some time, and I suspect that Karzai did a lot of shouting while Atmar and Saleh sat there stone-faced. Second, if either of them did get an opportunity to actually present their case, it's likely that questions were raised about the comprimising of the Afghan security apparatus by Karzai's friends and relatives.
Too early to estimate the full fallout from the resignations, but it's safe to say that it won't be good. At precisely the moment when ISAF needs a set credible partners in the ANSF to properly launch the summer offensive, two key ministries have lost their experienced chiefs. Despite some serious flaws with the ANP, Atmar was well respected by both the British and Americans and had a reasonably effective working relationship with his ISAF and U.S. Army counterparts.
By most accounts (including my own estimation), Saleh was one of few truly excellent leaders in the Karzai government. Due to the nature of his job (NDS is basically the secret police, essentially a combination of the CIA and FBI), Saleh kept a lower profile than most in the government, but his organization had become quite effective at rooting out cells of bad guys around the country. It's said that even if they couldn't do anything about it, NDS knew the details on the nefarious dealings of everyone, including those within the government itself.*
*Such knowledge was probably a contributing factor to Saleh's ouster. Even the much-feared NDS was prevented from operating effectively down in Kandahar by the interference of Ahmed Wali Karzai and other scumbags close to the President. Nevertheless, Saleh almost certainly knows where the bodies are buried (literally). If Karzai was smart, he would have kept Saleh in the government just to keep him quiet.
Saleh is an ethnic Tajik, and perhaps more importantly a Panjshiri Tajik and old comrade of Ahmed Shah, the most famous and most effective mujiheddin of the Soviet days. That made him unpopular in a government dominated by Pashtuns, but he was well liked by the various Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies. His relationship with the CIA goes back to the days of the Soviet occupation and it's said that he still maintains close ties with Langley.
Both men have been replaced by their deputies, people closer to the Karzai clan and presumably loyal to Karzai personally. General Munir Mangal, the former Deputy Interior Minister, has been promoted, and Ibrahim Spinzada is the new head of NDS. Both of these appointments are desribed as "temporary" but the Karzai administration is probably not going to expend a lot of effort looking for permanent solutions.
Spinzada is Karzai's brother-in-law and the Mangal clan has been loyal to Karzai for a long time. Looks like the President is using the attack on the jirga to consolidate his control over the security apparatus and remove a couple of more independently-minded rivals.
Not exactly what this country needs heading into the fighting season, and with the Taliban becoming more active every day.
Saturday, April 24, 2010
Beer, Booze and Bribery
As part of our continuing series detailing the depths of depravity and corruption that Afghanistan has sunk to, tonight I point you towards this story in the London Times, online edition.
Last Monday night, the ANP* decided to mount one of their periodic raids on local Kabul establishments that sell alcohol. A total of five were targeted, four of which were shut-down immediately. The last one escaped being shut down because the district police commander is a regular customer and cut a deal with the owner. I know because I was there at the time.
*Jerome Starkey, writing for the Times, describes these units as the "vice and virtue" police but that's not really accurate. There are no "vice" police here (and there damn sure ain't any virtue). It's just the regular ANP, supported by units of the NDS.
As per SOP, the next day the police described these places as "the centres of immorality and the centres of alcohol." Note also the use of the word "guesthouses" to describe these establishments, which implies rooms for sleeping and perhaps other nefarious activities (i.e. prostitution). Only one of these places was an actual "guesthouse" and that happened to be the one I was at.* So the only true guesthouse is the only one that didn't get shut down.
*And, just for the dirty-minded out there, there is no prostitution at that establishment. I was only drinking in the bar.
I also love the use of the phrase "center of immorality," as if your average Afghan cop is even passingly familiar with the concept of morality. Moral and cultural relativism aside, there are at least a few basic concepts that should be considered beyond "moral" and buggering underage boys and coercing bribes from the destitute probably fall outside those parameters. Both of which the ANP excels at.
Also per SOP, the cops carted off all the booze. As the article points out, "1,164 bottles of wine and 5,194 bottles of beer" were confiscated, to be destroyed later.
Um..........here's the thing: there's always way more hard liquor in these places than beer and wine. How come that stuff isn't mentioned in the press release? Because that's the valuable stuff. Anyone can get beer (and Afghans don't drink wine, generally speaking); it's the whisky and the vodka that's truly valuable. They don't mention that because it didn't make it into the official inventory. The hard stuff will be sold out of the back of ANP Ford Rangers for the next couple of weeks. I conducted a little experiment to confirm this and managed to procure four bottles of Johnnie Walker Red Label for $70 USD each (below market rates) from the ANP district chief who lives across the road. He even had a drink with me to seal the deal. So much for stamping out the vice of alcohol.
Next post: after the booze is carted off and the owners harassed and arrested, the truly despicable stuff starts. Everyone who thinks that all we need to do to solve Afghanistan's problems is to empower Afghan women should pay attention.
Last Monday night, the ANP* decided to mount one of their periodic raids on local Kabul establishments that sell alcohol. A total of five were targeted, four of which were shut-down immediately. The last one escaped being shut down because the district police commander is a regular customer and cut a deal with the owner. I know because I was there at the time.
*Jerome Starkey, writing for the Times, describes these units as the "vice and virtue" police but that's not really accurate. There are no "vice" police here (and there damn sure ain't any virtue). It's just the regular ANP, supported by units of the NDS.
As per SOP, the next day the police described these places as "the centres of immorality and the centres of alcohol." Note also the use of the word "guesthouses" to describe these establishments, which implies rooms for sleeping and perhaps other nefarious activities (i.e. prostitution). Only one of these places was an actual "guesthouse" and that happened to be the one I was at.* So the only true guesthouse is the only one that didn't get shut down.
*And, just for the dirty-minded out there, there is no prostitution at that establishment. I was only drinking in the bar.
I also love the use of the phrase "center of immorality," as if your average Afghan cop is even passingly familiar with the concept of morality. Moral and cultural relativism aside, there are at least a few basic concepts that should be considered beyond "moral" and buggering underage boys and coercing bribes from the destitute probably fall outside those parameters. Both of which the ANP excels at.
Also per SOP, the cops carted off all the booze. As the article points out, "1,164 bottles of wine and 5,194 bottles of beer" were confiscated, to be destroyed later.
Um..........here's the thing: there's always way more hard liquor in these places than beer and wine. How come that stuff isn't mentioned in the press release? Because that's the valuable stuff. Anyone can get beer (and Afghans don't drink wine, generally speaking); it's the whisky and the vodka that's truly valuable. They don't mention that because it didn't make it into the official inventory. The hard stuff will be sold out of the back of ANP Ford Rangers for the next couple of weeks. I conducted a little experiment to confirm this and managed to procure four bottles of Johnnie Walker Red Label for $70 USD each (below market rates) from the ANP district chief who lives across the road. He even had a drink with me to seal the deal. So much for stamping out the vice of alcohol.
Next post: after the booze is carted off and the owners harassed and arrested, the truly despicable stuff starts. Everyone who thinks that all we need to do to solve Afghanistan's problems is to empower Afghan women should pay attention.
Tuesday, April 20, 2010
Make a Buck, Take a Buck....or Two
By now, nearly everyone is aware of the endemic corruption of Afghanistan, which extends not only to all branches and levels of government but also to commercial and business activities, quasi-governmental organizations and aid/development organizations. Even ISAF is not immune to the taint of theft, bribery and corruption that exists here.*
*For instance, head down to the Bush Bazaar** and see the vast array of pilfered, purchased and purloined items for sale that only recently were the legal property of a NATO military force. Uniforms, tactical gear, body armor, MREs, boots, all of it available at a considerable discount, and all of it to use the Goodfellas terminology "fell off the back of a truck." I least one hopes it's stolen. Stories, perhaps apocryphal, exist of U.S. Army uniforms for sale in the bazaar with the bullet holes stiched up and some suspicious looking dark stains.
**Yes, it really is named after former-President Bush, although it's worth pointing out that back in the 80's there was a similar market selling stolen Russian gear and the locals called it the Brezhnev Bazaar. Re-selling of stolen goods has a long and glorious tradition in Afghanistan.
Basically, everyone here, from the lowliest shopkeeper to the highest government official* is in a mad scramble to grab every Afghani, rupee, ruble and dollar that they can get their hands on before ISAF finally bails out and this place returns to the Dark Ages from whence it came.
*Yeah, I'm looking at you Karzai. And your scumbag brother too.
Now I don't generally fault the average Afghani for trying to make a buck (even off of stolen goods). Most locals live on $100-$120 USD a month, and have to care for an extended family. As long as they do what they say they will do, and don't try to cheat me or my people, I can live with it.*
*Unfortunately, the list of Afghans I know personally after fourteen months here who haven't 1) broken a promise to me, or 2) tried to screw my company, my guys, or me personally, is short enough that I can count it on my fingers. With fingers to spare.
However, the "official" corruption, especially of the police, is something that I cannot forgive. The common argument is that the police aren't paid very well (true) and therefore one should expect a certain level of corruption (false). The fallacy of that argument is contained within itself.
If the police aren't paid well (and they aren't), they could get jobs that pay nearly as well without all of the occupational hazards that come with an ANP uniform, like being reviled by the local population and targeted by the bad guys. I know there are jobs out there that pay just as well as the ANP without the attendant risks. I know this because my company (among many others) provides many of those jobs.
But Afghans join the ANP for reasons other than the official pay. Mostly, they join because a police uniform is license to do anything they want (including get away with murder- more on this later) without fear of repecussion. It's not the pay they receive, it's not even the bribes they demand (and get), it's the near-total impunity that comes with the uniform and the Kalashnikov.*
*Think Georgia State Trooper with an automatic weapon and without those pesky Miranda rights or the ACLU looking over his shoulder.
To follow, a couple of posts that demonstrate in deplorable fashion the truly depraved and degraded state of the Afghan National Police. When this country descends back into the cesspit from which it never should have crawled, lots of fingers will be pointed at those supposedly at fault for "losing Afghanistan." Make no mistake about it. When Afghanistan is "lost" it will be because of the Afghans themselves.
*For instance, head down to the Bush Bazaar** and see the vast array of pilfered, purchased and purloined items for sale that only recently were the legal property of a NATO military force. Uniforms, tactical gear, body armor, MREs, boots, all of it available at a considerable discount, and all of it to use the Goodfellas terminology "fell off the back of a truck." I least one hopes it's stolen. Stories, perhaps apocryphal, exist of U.S. Army uniforms for sale in the bazaar with the bullet holes stiched up and some suspicious looking dark stains.
**Yes, it really is named after former-President Bush, although it's worth pointing out that back in the 80's there was a similar market selling stolen Russian gear and the locals called it the Brezhnev Bazaar. Re-selling of stolen goods has a long and glorious tradition in Afghanistan.
Basically, everyone here, from the lowliest shopkeeper to the highest government official* is in a mad scramble to grab every Afghani, rupee, ruble and dollar that they can get their hands on before ISAF finally bails out and this place returns to the Dark Ages from whence it came.
*Yeah, I'm looking at you Karzai. And your scumbag brother too.
Now I don't generally fault the average Afghani for trying to make a buck (even off of stolen goods). Most locals live on $100-$120 USD a month, and have to care for an extended family. As long as they do what they say they will do, and don't try to cheat me or my people, I can live with it.*
*Unfortunately, the list of Afghans I know personally after fourteen months here who haven't 1) broken a promise to me, or 2) tried to screw my company, my guys, or me personally, is short enough that I can count it on my fingers. With fingers to spare.
However, the "official" corruption, especially of the police, is something that I cannot forgive. The common argument is that the police aren't paid very well (true) and therefore one should expect a certain level of corruption (false). The fallacy of that argument is contained within itself.
If the police aren't paid well (and they aren't), they could get jobs that pay nearly as well without all of the occupational hazards that come with an ANP uniform, like being reviled by the local population and targeted by the bad guys. I know there are jobs out there that pay just as well as the ANP without the attendant risks. I know this because my company (among many others) provides many of those jobs.
But Afghans join the ANP for reasons other than the official pay. Mostly, they join because a police uniform is license to do anything they want (including get away with murder- more on this later) without fear of repecussion. It's not the pay they receive, it's not even the bribes they demand (and get), it's the near-total impunity that comes with the uniform and the Kalashnikov.*
*Think Georgia State Trooper with an automatic weapon and without those pesky Miranda rights or the ACLU looking over his shoulder.
To follow, a couple of posts that demonstrate in deplorable fashion the truly depraved and degraded state of the Afghan National Police. When this country descends back into the cesspit from which it never should have crawled, lots of fingers will be pointed at those supposedly at fault for "losing Afghanistan." Make no mistake about it. When Afghanistan is "lost" it will be because of the Afghans themselves.
Fatal Corruption
Long-time readers will remember the rather tense morning I had back in October 2009. For the newcomers, that particular date was the morning where I was awakened by the sound of gunfire.
I'm somewhat accostomed to being awakened at odd and inappropriate hours by various external stimuli, everything from earthquakes to carbombs to gunfire to the guards at the ECP accidentally triggering the "panic button."*
*Which is actually pretty funny, in a tension-busting, early-morning kind of way. A bunch of guys standing around in their shorts, holding assault rifles, one third looking like they just shit themselves, one third looking like they are desperately hoping that the bad guys are actually coming through the gate and the final third (mostly the South Africans) looking like they've been through this a million times before (which they have). Odd crew that I live with.
Back in October of 2009 however I wasn't yet in my currently luxuorious surroundings. Instead, I was living by myself in a three-story shithouse over in Shar-e-Naw with only an AK-47 and a feral cat for company.* And then this happened.
*He later died. It was sad.
Needless to say, not the way to start the day. Being the type of person to strongly object to being awakened at any hour, especially early in the pre-dawn darkness, I did what seemed logical at the time- grab the AK-47 and go out on the balcony to see what's going on.*
* The cat, to his credit, was nowhere to be found.
This, as it turned out, was perhaps not the wisest course of action. I won't go into the details again (see here and here), but suffice it to say that six people died in the guesthouse about forty yards from my door. One of those people was an American by the name of Louis Maxwell, a security guard for the United Nations.
Maxwell, with the support of another UN security guard, Laurance Mefful, in an effort to protect those under his charge, had the reflexes and the foresight to get himself into position on the balcony of the guesthouse and engage the bad guys coming through the gate. I can't say if he managed to take any of them down, but the fact that the gunfight went on for about five minutes before the first ANP arrived is a testament to his ability. At the very least, Maxwell managed to keep the bad guys out of the main building until most of his compatriots had escaped out the back. Although he was apparently wounded, he held his position until the attackers were dead*, thereby saving probably more than a dozen lives.
*Killed either by Maxwell himself or by the recently-arrived units of the ANCOP, a sort of SWAT team for the ANP.
Louis Maxwell committed himself effectively and honorably and survived the Taliban attack. It was only after he came down from the roof, and after the ANP had secured the compound, that he was killed. According to video obtained by the UN, he was shot at point-blank range by Afghan police in the courtyard of the guesthouse. The reason? They wanted his gun.*
*Based on the file photo of Maxwell, the weapon appears to be a Heckler & Koch G36K, which is a top-end assault rifle. Pretty rare here, but often the preferred choice of a professional shooter.
I'm sure the Karzai administration will claim that it was a case of mistaken identity or friendly fire, but take a look at this picture of Maxwell. Does he look like Taliban to you? Does he even look Afghan? At a hundred meters anyone could tell that he wasn't a bad guy.
No, it was simple greed that triggered Louis Maxwell's murder. A scumbag Afghan cop, hyped up on violence and blood and sure of his own immunity, saw his chance to steal a weapon worth a few thousand dollars. So he executed a wounded man, and then picked up the weapon and walked calmly away. None of the hundreds of Afghan police or soldiers in the vicinity made any move to stop him.
This country makes me sick sometimes.
H/T and photo credit to Feral Jundi.
I'm somewhat accostomed to being awakened at odd and inappropriate hours by various external stimuli, everything from earthquakes to carbombs to gunfire to the guards at the ECP accidentally triggering the "panic button."*
*Which is actually pretty funny, in a tension-busting, early-morning kind of way. A bunch of guys standing around in their shorts, holding assault rifles, one third looking like they just shit themselves, one third looking like they are desperately hoping that the bad guys are actually coming through the gate and the final third (mostly the South Africans) looking like they've been through this a million times before (which they have). Odd crew that I live with.
Back in October of 2009 however I wasn't yet in my currently luxuorious surroundings. Instead, I was living by myself in a three-story shithouse over in Shar-e-Naw with only an AK-47 and a feral cat for company.* And then this happened.
*He later died. It was sad.
Needless to say, not the way to start the day. Being the type of person to strongly object to being awakened at any hour, especially early in the pre-dawn darkness, I did what seemed logical at the time- grab the AK-47 and go out on the balcony to see what's going on.*
* The cat, to his credit, was nowhere to be found.
This, as it turned out, was perhaps not the wisest course of action. I won't go into the details again (see here and here), but suffice it to say that six people died in the guesthouse about forty yards from my door. One of those people was an American by the name of Louis Maxwell, a security guard for the United Nations.
Maxwell, with the support of another UN security guard, Laurance Mefful, in an effort to protect those under his charge, had the reflexes and the foresight to get himself into position on the balcony of the guesthouse and engage the bad guys coming through the gate. I can't say if he managed to take any of them down, but the fact that the gunfight went on for about five minutes before the first ANP arrived is a testament to his ability. At the very least, Maxwell managed to keep the bad guys out of the main building until most of his compatriots had escaped out the back. Although he was apparently wounded, he held his position until the attackers were dead*, thereby saving probably more than a dozen lives.
*Killed either by Maxwell himself or by the recently-arrived units of the ANCOP, a sort of SWAT team for the ANP.
Louis Maxwell committed himself effectively and honorably and survived the Taliban attack. It was only after he came down from the roof, and after the ANP had secured the compound, that he was killed. According to video obtained by the UN, he was shot at point-blank range by Afghan police in the courtyard of the guesthouse. The reason? They wanted his gun.*
*Based on the file photo of Maxwell, the weapon appears to be a Heckler & Koch G36K, which is a top-end assault rifle. Pretty rare here, but often the preferred choice of a professional shooter.
I'm sure the Karzai administration will claim that it was a case of mistaken identity or friendly fire, but take a look at this picture of Maxwell. Does he look like Taliban to you? Does he even look Afghan? At a hundred meters anyone could tell that he wasn't a bad guy.
No, it was simple greed that triggered Louis Maxwell's murder. A scumbag Afghan cop, hyped up on violence and blood and sure of his own immunity, saw his chance to steal a weapon worth a few thousand dollars. So he executed a wounded man, and then picked up the weapon and walked calmly away. None of the hundreds of Afghan police or soldiers in the vicinity made any move to stop him.
This country makes me sick sometimes.
H/T and photo credit to Feral Jundi.
Tuesday, May 12, 2009
Grenade Fishing
Well, there are occasionally signs of progress in Afghanistan. Recently, President Karzai made a stunning legislative move with far-reaching social implications. No, I'm not talking about the proposed new law that, among other things, allows Shia men (mostly Hazara) to rape their wives without penalty.
The stunning new law I'm referring to is the one that once and for all bans grenade-fishing in Afghanistan. For those of you not familiar with grenade-fishing, it's a favorite method for gathering cheap eats without all the effort of actually casting a line or throwing a net. Basically, you find a pond or a lake with a decent amount of fish, and throw in some hand grenades or whatever other explosives you have handy. The concussion kills the fish en masse and the float to the surface, ready for easy scooping and frying. Very cost-effective, assuming one has access to sufficient explosives.
Well according to President Karzai, grenade fishing has been banned "to help protect wildlife and the environment." No word on whether hunting goats with RPGs will also be banned.
The stunning new law I'm referring to is the one that once and for all bans grenade-fishing in Afghanistan. For those of you not familiar with grenade-fishing, it's a favorite method for gathering cheap eats without all the effort of actually casting a line or throwing a net. Basically, you find a pond or a lake with a decent amount of fish, and throw in some hand grenades or whatever other explosives you have handy. The concussion kills the fish en masse and the float to the surface, ready for easy scooping and frying. Very cost-effective, assuming one has access to sufficient explosives.
Well according to President Karzai, grenade fishing has been banned "to help protect wildlife and the environment." No word on whether hunting goats with RPGs will also be banned.
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