As a follow-up to yesterday's post about Team Canada down in Kandahar, here's a post from the anonymous expat at Kandahar Diary about the dangers of operating in and around Kandahar.
The PSC that he works for is heavily involved in some of the most difficult work in this country, escorting fuel convoys to ISAF bases. Highway One is dodgy pretty much anywhere, but it's especially bad between Kabul and Helmand, and KD's guys make the run from Kandahar west on a daily basis. Not a road I'd want to drive regularly.
The Rug Merchant has accused me in the past of pricing us out of the lucrative logistics market in Kandahar and Helmand, and in a sense he's right. I won't put my people at risk on that road under those circumstances without a guarantee that we're making enough money to cover our expenses, including the inevitable death benefits we'd have to pay. Can't do it on the cheap, better to not do it at all.*
*The single most annoying trait of Afghan businessmen is to over-promise and under-deliver. Afghans, my boss included, will underbid every job just to get the work and then flounder about trying to find a way to make it work. Ultimately, with that approach, people get dead.
That said, we're looking at a couple of large static jobs in Kandahar and Helmand that might deploy later this summer. Static security is considerably more manageable than mobile logistics security, but any operations down south come with considerable risks. All that remains is to convince the potential clients that their security is perhaps not the best place to cut costs.
Showing posts with label Blogroll. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Blogroll. Show all posts
Thursday, July 22, 2010
Monday, July 5, 2010
Unity of Effort
Matt over at Feral Jundi draws attention to yesterday's speech by incoming ISAF commander General David Petraeus (aka Super Dave), in which his main theme was 'unity of effort,' within the ISAF hierarchy, their civilian counterparts and the Afghan government.*
*Good luck with those last two elements. The Afghan government can't even manage unity of effort within itself, much less with ISAF and Western diplomats. And as for the civilian side, Ambassador Eikenberry was quoted as telling General Petraeus that he was "welcome at this (U.S.) Embassy 24/7." Well no shit, Eik. Thanks for the hall pass. Petraeus is the theatre commander in charge of 130,000 coalition troops, 100,000 of those American. Did anyone seriously believe that he might not be "welcome" at his own embassy? Exhibit A for why Eikenberry should spend the rest of his diplomatic career stamping visas in Bangladesh. With a supervisor watching him closely.
Unity of effort is one of the cornerstones of successful COIN theory, the idea being that all elements of the COIN-force have to be working from a common plan with clearly defined goals and joint operations to achieve them. Matt suggests that the 100,000+ contractors currently in Afghanistan should be included under this unity of effort umbrella, and wonders how exactly to make that happen.
Leaving aside the near-certainty that Super Dave and his staff don't spend a lot of time thinking about contractors,* there is a fairly simple way for ISAF to create a more effective working relationship with the contractor community.
*Let's face it: the bigwigs at ISAF don't put a lot of effort into thinking about the contractors working for them. Part of the value of contractors (to ISAF and the U.S. military) is that shit gets done without them having to think about it. Need supplies at that remote COP? Call a contractor. Need some extra perimeter security at a FOB? Call a contractor. Need a suck-truck to empty the septic tanks at Camp Phoenix? Call a contractor. Need anything done that won't be reflected on a promotion board evaluation? Yep, call those contractors and throw some cash at them.
There is a venue for Petraeus to meet personally with movers and shakers of the security community here. The PSCAA (Private Security Companies Association of Afghanistan) is the coordinating and lobbying group for all PSCs interested in working here long-term. (They're supported in their efforts by the Union of Private Security Companies, which is limited to Afghan-owned outfits and whose meetings I've had the unfortunate luck to attend.) Mostly it's a talking-shop and a venue for sharing complaints about the ineptitude of the Afghan government and the Ministry of Interior.* The irregular meetings are not particularly well-attended and usually degenerate into a bitch-fest pretty quickly.
*It's also a handy place to pick up tips on which MoI officials are susceptible to "success-guarantee fees." A wonderful euphemism, don't you think?
However, if General Petraeus (or any senior officer from ISAF) made it known that he would like to address the PSCAA, I'm sure that every country manager from all 52 licensed companies would be there, with most of their operations staff, and all on their best behavior. Spread among those 52 companies, there are hundreds of millions of dollars of contracts supporting ISAF and U.S. Army operations. Even the contracts that aren't written with PSCs directly usually involve a security element at some point.
A couple of hours with General Petraeus would give those country managers a better idea of what ISAF requires by way of support, and hopefully give Super Dave a better appreciation of exactly how integral to his efforts we really are. Even if we disagree on tactics and strategy (which we almost certainly would), there would be value in the discussion.
The ops and intel staffs at ISAF might even benefit, because there'd be a decades of Afghanistan experience among the PSC management in that room. Unlike the ten-months-and-rotate-out planning staff at Camp Phoenix and Bagram, most senior staff for private security companies spend years here, and they learn how to operate in Afghanistan very effectively.
So, Super Dave? Whadda ya' think? Want to come have some chai with your backup?
(Just do me a favor and leave Eik and Holbrooke off the invite list. This isn't a photo op, so they shouldn't mind too much.)
*Good luck with those last two elements. The Afghan government can't even manage unity of effort within itself, much less with ISAF and Western diplomats. And as for the civilian side, Ambassador Eikenberry was quoted as telling General Petraeus that he was "welcome at this (U.S.) Embassy 24/7." Well no shit, Eik. Thanks for the hall pass. Petraeus is the theatre commander in charge of 130,000 coalition troops, 100,000 of those American. Did anyone seriously believe that he might not be "welcome" at his own embassy? Exhibit A for why Eikenberry should spend the rest of his diplomatic career stamping visas in Bangladesh. With a supervisor watching him closely.
Unity of effort is one of the cornerstones of successful COIN theory, the idea being that all elements of the COIN-force have to be working from a common plan with clearly defined goals and joint operations to achieve them. Matt suggests that the 100,000+ contractors currently in Afghanistan should be included under this unity of effort umbrella, and wonders how exactly to make that happen.
Leaving aside the near-certainty that Super Dave and his staff don't spend a lot of time thinking about contractors,* there is a fairly simple way for ISAF to create a more effective working relationship with the contractor community.
*Let's face it: the bigwigs at ISAF don't put a lot of effort into thinking about the contractors working for them. Part of the value of contractors (to ISAF and the U.S. military) is that shit gets done without them having to think about it. Need supplies at that remote COP? Call a contractor. Need some extra perimeter security at a FOB? Call a contractor. Need a suck-truck to empty the septic tanks at Camp Phoenix? Call a contractor. Need anything done that won't be reflected on a promotion board evaluation? Yep, call those contractors and throw some cash at them.
There is a venue for Petraeus to meet personally with movers and shakers of the security community here. The PSCAA (Private Security Companies Association of Afghanistan) is the coordinating and lobbying group for all PSCs interested in working here long-term. (They're supported in their efforts by the Union of Private Security Companies, which is limited to Afghan-owned outfits and whose meetings I've had the unfortunate luck to attend.) Mostly it's a talking-shop and a venue for sharing complaints about the ineptitude of the Afghan government and the Ministry of Interior.* The irregular meetings are not particularly well-attended and usually degenerate into a bitch-fest pretty quickly.
*It's also a handy place to pick up tips on which MoI officials are susceptible to "success-guarantee fees." A wonderful euphemism, don't you think?
However, if General Petraeus (or any senior officer from ISAF) made it known that he would like to address the PSCAA, I'm sure that every country manager from all 52 licensed companies would be there, with most of their operations staff, and all on their best behavior. Spread among those 52 companies, there are hundreds of millions of dollars of contracts supporting ISAF and U.S. Army operations. Even the contracts that aren't written with PSCs directly usually involve a security element at some point.
A couple of hours with General Petraeus would give those country managers a better idea of what ISAF requires by way of support, and hopefully give Super Dave a better appreciation of exactly how integral to his efforts we really are. Even if we disagree on tactics and strategy (which we almost certainly would), there would be value in the discussion.
The ops and intel staffs at ISAF might even benefit, because there'd be a decades of Afghanistan experience among the PSC management in that room. Unlike the ten-months-and-rotate-out planning staff at Camp Phoenix and Bagram, most senior staff for private security companies spend years here, and they learn how to operate in Afghanistan very effectively.
So, Super Dave? Whadda ya' think? Want to come have some chai with your backup?
(Just do me a favor and leave Eik and Holbrooke off the invite list. This isn't a photo op, so they shouldn't mind too much.)
Monday, June 14, 2010
Four Lions
We all know that the Taliban, even the rank-and-file gun bunnies, can be tough, resourceful, and wicked hard to stop. And this is generally thought to be the case for Islamic jihadists in general, at least as far as the Western security organizations and international media are concerned.
However, it is worth remembering that most of the malcontents and scumbags drawn to that self-destructive and self-defeating lifestyle are, well, just that.......malcontents and scumbags. And usually not very bright ones at that.
Evidence for that can be found in many of the laughably inept attempts to deliver "Islamic justice" to the so-called Western oppressors. Sure, there have been successful attacks like 9-11, the London and Madrid bombings and the attack on the USS Cole. But there have also been some abject failures, distinguished only by their pathetic planning and bungled execution. Just think of the original shoe bomber*, his spiritual successor or the-carbomb-that-wasn't in Times Square.**
*Just take a look at the picture of Richard Reid, aka Abdul Raheem. That's pretty strong evidence for the theory that cousins shouldn't marry.
**Seriously, there's a bit more to an ammonium-nitrate fertilizer bomb than just throwing some firecrackers, propane and a few bags of Scott's Lawncare in the back of an SUV.
So, it's nice to note that someone has finally decided it was time to illustrate these buffoons in an amusing way. Here's the trailer for a new British flick that promises to entertain certain people at the same time it infuriates others:
I have no dobut that this film will trigger a new fatwa from the hardline Muslim preachers in Britain and a fresh round of hand-wringing from their liberal establishment apologists. However, at the end of the day it's useful to remember that the quickest way to undercut this brutal and medieval creed is to poke fun at it. No institution or movement withstands the harsh light of effective satire very long. Just ask Sarah Palin.
N.B. Hat-tip to Londonstani who has a deeper (and more serious) post about this issue over at Abu Muqawama's blog on CNAS.
However, it is worth remembering that most of the malcontents and scumbags drawn to that self-destructive and self-defeating lifestyle are, well, just that.......malcontents and scumbags. And usually not very bright ones at that.
Evidence for that can be found in many of the laughably inept attempts to deliver "Islamic justice" to the so-called Western oppressors. Sure, there have been successful attacks like 9-11, the London and Madrid bombings and the attack on the USS Cole. But there have also been some abject failures, distinguished only by their pathetic planning and bungled execution. Just think of the original shoe bomber*, his spiritual successor or the-carbomb-that-wasn't in Times Square.**
*Just take a look at the picture of Richard Reid, aka Abdul Raheem. That's pretty strong evidence for the theory that cousins shouldn't marry.
**Seriously, there's a bit more to an ammonium-nitrate fertilizer bomb than just throwing some firecrackers, propane and a few bags of Scott's Lawncare in the back of an SUV.
So, it's nice to note that someone has finally decided it was time to illustrate these buffoons in an amusing way. Here's the trailer for a new British flick that promises to entertain certain people at the same time it infuriates others:
I have no dobut that this film will trigger a new fatwa from the hardline Muslim preachers in Britain and a fresh round of hand-wringing from their liberal establishment apologists. However, at the end of the day it's useful to remember that the quickest way to undercut this brutal and medieval creed is to poke fun at it. No institution or movement withstands the harsh light of effective satire very long. Just ask Sarah Palin.
N.B. Hat-tip to Londonstani who has a deeper (and more serious) post about this issue over at Abu Muqawama's blog on CNAS.
Wednesday, May 26, 2010
DVM Looking for Contributors
The always-entertaining guys over at Death Valley Magazine are looking for people interested in contributing to their site. In keeping with the catch-all style of the blog, the list of desired job categories is pretty broad, as is the scope of categories they routinely cover, so anyone looking to write the occasional post for James G., Bubba and the gang should click here.
Why they insist on adding more contributors and thereby increasing the frequency of their posts, and thereby make lazy people like me look bad by comparison, is a question I intend to raise with them at the earliest opportunity. As soon as I find my body armor, extra ammo and my go-bag.
Why they insist on adding more contributors and thereby increasing the frequency of their posts, and thereby make lazy people like me look bad by comparison, is a question I intend to raise with them at the earliest opportunity. As soon as I find my body armor, extra ammo and my go-bag.
Wednesday, April 14, 2010
Kandahar Diary
Another blog to add to the list of Afghan-centric stuff in the blogroll. As a nice bonus (for me), this one's written by a security contractor based down south in Kandahar. Appears to be handling mostly mobile logistics security, which is always a tough gig, especially down south. On the upside, he seems to be in a management/oversight position, so he doesn't have to ride in the cab of a fuel tanker, which is nice.
Like me, the author of Kandahar Diary maintains his anonymity for personal, professional and OPSEC reasons. He mentions that he flew in from Brisbane, so possibly Australian, but also possibly not.*
*Based on what I know about PSC convoy ops down south and from the few clues gleaned from his posts, I could speculate about the outfit he works for but I won't. He doesn't mention it, so neither will I.
From the few posts he's put up so far, I can tell he'll be an entertaining read. He already posseses the standard disdain for Big Army fobbits, as is obvious by his reference to them as "pasty faced, pudding-gutted base pogos." And that's the guys who live at KAF. Here's hoping he never has to see the paragons of the fobbit species resident at Bagram. He'd probably shoot them on site. Or puke. Or both.
Only thing I differ with him on is his complaints about the food. Lack of fresh fruit? Check. Too much chicken? Check. Piss-warm UHT milk? Check. Luke-warm bacon? Check.........wait, WTF? You've got BACON?!?!? I haven't had bacon since shortly after New Years Day. I'd gladly shoot somebody for some pork products, luke-warm or otherwise. Apparently life down south ain't all bad.
One other thing to mention: the author notes that he is on a ten-week deployment. That is one of the key advantages (perhaps THE key advantage) to working for a Western outfit. Reliable, predictable leave schedules, with a limited time in-country on deployments. Ten weeks on, three or four weeks off is the industry standard here. Needless to say, I've had a total of five weeks off in the last thirteen months and even that time was really more of a "working vacation." The price you pay working for an Afghan outfit (one of many).
And I recognized myself in this quote:
Sounds familiar, except for the bit about "a couple in the morning and nothing again until 6:00 p.m." That's just insane.
Like me, the author of Kandahar Diary maintains his anonymity for personal, professional and OPSEC reasons. He mentions that he flew in from Brisbane, so possibly Australian, but also possibly not.*
*Based on what I know about PSC convoy ops down south and from the few clues gleaned from his posts, I could speculate about the outfit he works for but I won't. He doesn't mention it, so neither will I.
From the few posts he's put up so far, I can tell he'll be an entertaining read. He already posseses the standard disdain for Big Army fobbits, as is obvious by his reference to them as "pasty faced, pudding-gutted base pogos." And that's the guys who live at KAF. Here's hoping he never has to see the paragons of the fobbit species resident at Bagram. He'd probably shoot them on site. Or puke. Or both.
Only thing I differ with him on is his complaints about the food. Lack of fresh fruit? Check. Too much chicken? Check. Piss-warm UHT milk? Check. Luke-warm bacon? Check.........wait, WTF? You've got BACON?!?!? I haven't had bacon since shortly after New Years Day. I'd gladly shoot somebody for some pork products, luke-warm or otherwise. Apparently life down south ain't all bad.
One other thing to mention: the author notes that he is on a ten-week deployment. That is one of the key advantages (perhaps THE key advantage) to working for a Western outfit. Reliable, predictable leave schedules, with a limited time in-country on deployments. Ten weeks on, three or four weeks off is the industry standard here. Needless to say, I've had a total of five weeks off in the last thirteen months and even that time was really more of a "working vacation." The price you pay working for an Afghan outfit (one of many).
And I recognized myself in this quote:
I am smoking too much – I need to get back on the home routine of a couple in the morning and nothing again until 6.00 p.m. Don’t even think of saying I should give it up – this is neither the time nor the place for that.
Sounds familiar, except for the bit about "a couple in the morning and nothing again until 6:00 p.m." That's just insane.
Friday, March 5, 2010
Death Valley
Back in the States, Death Valley refers to the desert on the border of California and Nevada, the lowest point in the U.S. Here, when people refer to Death Valley, they usually mean either the Tagab or Alasay Valleys, or the Arghandab down south.**
*Full disclosure, we have recruited in the Tagab and Alasay valleys. They can become no-go areas for ISAF forces, but with the right contacts they can yield some very tough people willing to work in extremely dicey areas.
**Although, in a nod to a certain conflict in Southeast Asia, all of those are also sometimes referred to by local American forces as "Happy Valley."
However, it does have another meaning, Death Valley Magazine, an online repository for useful information, reviews of the latest gear and the occasional bit of humor or commentary. The homepage is here. Chock full of good advice (check out this bit on the Greyman). Written by a consortium of guys, so they are able to to post something every damn day. Something I haven't been able to manage (yet).
Perhaps too esoteric for people not actually involved in this business,* but worth a look if you spend time in the shitty bits of the world, or enjoy reading about those who do.
*How many people outside of the PSC world really need a review of the latest in tactical gear? Or knives?
*Full disclosure, we have recruited in the Tagab and Alasay valleys. They can become no-go areas for ISAF forces, but with the right contacts they can yield some very tough people willing to work in extremely dicey areas.
**Although, in a nod to a certain conflict in Southeast Asia, all of those are also sometimes referred to by local American forces as "Happy Valley."
However, it does have another meaning, Death Valley Magazine, an online repository for useful information, reviews of the latest gear and the occasional bit of humor or commentary. The homepage is here. Chock full of good advice (check out this bit on the Greyman). Written by a consortium of guys, so they are able to to post something every damn day. Something I haven't been able to manage (yet).
Perhaps too esoteric for people not actually involved in this business,* but worth a look if you spend time in the shitty bits of the world, or enjoy reading about those who do.
*How many people outside of the PSC world really need a review of the latest in tactical gear? Or knives?
Monday, January 18, 2010
BlogRoll Pt. III
Final additions to the blogroll, divided into two groups.
The first group are blogs that deal with military affairs, especially counter-insurgency operations, and with defense policy more generally. As I said before, if you just come here to make sure I'm still breathing and read about the most recent bit of Afghan lunacy, then these blogs are probably not for you. Fair enough. However, if you have any interest in current defense policy, I can assure you that these are some of the best sources of analysis out there.
The second group is a diverse collection of foreign policy, international relations and political blogs, with a couple of completely unrelated ones that I included just because I like them. Note that I have not included many of the major, more established blogs here, mostly because I don't read them. I did include several that are written by former colleagues or classmates of mine. Perhaps that will provide them the incentive they need to start posting on a more regular basis.
You know who you are. Get to work.
The first group are blogs that deal with military affairs, especially counter-insurgency operations, and with defense policy more generally. As I said before, if you just come here to make sure I'm still breathing and read about the most recent bit of Afghan lunacy, then these blogs are probably not for you. Fair enough. However, if you have any interest in current defense policy, I can assure you that these are some of the best sources of analysis out there.
The second group is a diverse collection of foreign policy, international relations and political blogs, with a couple of completely unrelated ones that I included just because I like them. Note that I have not included many of the major, more established blogs here, mostly because I don't read them. I did include several that are written by former colleagues or classmates of mine. Perhaps that will provide them the incentive they need to start posting on a more regular basis.
You know who you are. Get to work.
Sunday, January 17, 2010
BlogRoll Pt. II
Another section to add to the blogroll on the right, this time focused on the private security industry. Key among this group is the ever-useful Feral Jundi, which serves as a information aggregator for the entire industry. It was Matt at Feral Jundi that provided the impetus to actually get around to adding my blogroll in the first place.
Also in there is the personal blog of Eeben Barlow, the former CEO of Executive Outcomes, perhaps the most successful (operationally speaking) of all the modern PSCs. For a few years in the 1990s, they were the most feared and respected outfit in southern and western Africa.
For those of you who don't care about the private security industry, and just come here to read my latest ruminations on life at the ass-end of the world, feel free to ignore all this stuff.
Also in there is the personal blog of Eeben Barlow, the former CEO of Executive Outcomes, perhaps the most successful (operationally speaking) of all the modern PSCs. For a few years in the 1990s, they were the most feared and respected outfit in southern and western Africa.
For those of you who don't care about the private security industry, and just come here to read my latest ruminations on life at the ass-end of the world, feel free to ignore all this stuff.
Saturday, January 16, 2010
BlogRoll
I finally got around to adding a blogroll to the sidebar. The first additions are blogs on or about Afghanistan that I read regularly. All of them are good (that's why they're in my Google Reader), but I want to highlight a couple that standout above the rest.
Abu Muqawama is the nom de guerre of Andrew Exum, a former US Army Ranger who served tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He's written extensively about both theatres, including this book. Currently, he's a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS bio here), which has been described as the "go to think-tank on military affairs."
Tim Lynch at Free Range International is a former Marine who now operates as a private security consultant in Afghanistan, mostly out of the eastern city of Jalalabad. He's often pretty harsh on ISAF tactics and operations (not wrong, just harsh), but he knows this country well, having operated here for a long time. Plus, he's an tireless advocate of the low-profile approach (i.e. no armored vehicles with tinted windows, nowrap-around sunglasses and no prominently displayed firepower). Since I rely on the low-profile approach to keep myself and my clients safe, it's helpful to see how others do it. He also has a crew of co-bloggers (old Afghan hands like himself) who contribute regularly.
There will be further additions to the blogroll in the future, both under Afghan Blogs and in some new categories. If anyone has any suggestions, please send me a link and I'll check it out.
Abu Muqawama is the nom de guerre of Andrew Exum, a former US Army Ranger who served tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan. He's written extensively about both theatres, including this book. Currently, he's a Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS bio here), which has been described as the "go to think-tank on military affairs."
Tim Lynch at Free Range International is a former Marine who now operates as a private security consultant in Afghanistan, mostly out of the eastern city of Jalalabad. He's often pretty harsh on ISAF tactics and operations (not wrong, just harsh), but he knows this country well, having operated here for a long time. Plus, he's an tireless advocate of the low-profile approach (i.e. no armored vehicles with tinted windows, nowrap-around sunglasses and no prominently displayed firepower). Since I rely on the low-profile approach to keep myself and my clients safe, it's helpful to see how others do it. He also has a crew of co-bloggers (old Afghan hands like himself) who contribute regularly.
There will be further additions to the blogroll in the future, both under Afghan Blogs and in some new categories. If anyone has any suggestions, please send me a link and I'll check it out.
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