Al-Hindustani

Lt. Srinivasan (or al-Hindustani as the ANA call him) has another good post up at the NY Times At War blog about his time down south co-located with an ANA unit.

This bit reminded me of my first couple of days, now almost nineteen months ago:

This wasn’t about respect anymore. It was about trust. I could watch their eyes retelling my every move and word since I set foot on this post. They had been sizing me up this entire time.
I felt like a lamb surrounded by a herd of wolves, teasing me by keeping their fangs at bay.

Plus, I'm curious to know where an ANA lieutenent got his hands on a chrome-plated 9mm Desert Eagle pistol when I have to get by with a crappy Smith & Wesson.

Maximizing Self-Interest

The NY Times has a good series of reports running on their website currently, written by a US Army lieutenent who was stationed in Kandahar. Unlike most of the high-level analysis offered by traditional news sources, Lt. Srinavasan's stuff is local, personal and micro-scale news, about his day-to-day challenges in dealing with Afghans in his sector. (I believe that he's writing about stuff that happened on his recent deployment, rather than posting real-time events.)

His latest column is chock full of interesting tidbits about the intricacies of dealing with locals, and neatly captures the shift that comes over an officious Afghan army officer when he realizes that he's not going to be able to take advantage of the newbies.

Unfortuately, the lieutenent's conclusions are probably spot-on:

But Captain Kalay represented to me the greatest frustration and disappointment of all: no matter how many troops, how much time, or how much money we throw at Afghanistan, no democracy can take hold and nothing will change unless this country’s leaders want it for their own nation. Captain Kalay is a powerful man — he has no incentive to want anything more than the status quo.........I was right about one thing though; this is indeed a math problem, not only to me, but also to Captain Kalay and every Afghan leader in this country. It’s about the maximization of self-interest. No matter how much Captain Kalay likes me, or even identifies with me, it doesn’t change the fact that he will act only to maximize his personal gain.

The truth of that was recently brought home to me when I was alerted to the fact that a man I considered a close friend in Afghanistan, and one of the best Afghans I had met thus far, was not as clean and as honest as I thought he was. He wasn't stealing from me directly, but he had kept certain information to himself and taken credit and profited personally from something I had worked very hard on. To make matters worse, the story of his deception was provided to me by another Afghan I had also considered to be trustworthy, but the revelation is causing me to question the trust I place in him as well.* Now I'm left wondering what kind of payment he will expect in return for revealing this secret.

*And yes, I did confirm the story through independent sources.

First installment of Lt. Srinavasan's story here. Second and third, here and here.

Nation Building?

The other day, in a post titled Taliban Justice, I noted a Time Magazine story with a rather disturbing cover photo. The story was basically a human-interest piece about the fate of an Afghan girl named Aisha who had been horribly mutilated by the Taliban for fleeing an abusive, arranged marriage.

One commenter (known only as "b") wrote:

The girl was mutilated a year ago. At that time there were some 100,000 NATO troops in country plus lots of contractors. So if a 100,000 troops can't prevent such, what are they doing there? And how would that change with 200,000 troops? Just asking ...

A fair question, but here's the thing: no matter how many troops we have here, Western forces cannot ever put a stop to this sort of thing. The marginalization, diminution and sometimes abuse of women is part and parcel of Afghan culture. Western military force will never put an end to that. Only Afghans can end that, if they so choose.

I've been here nearly 18 months, working closely everyday with a large number of Afghans. In all that time, not once have I met the wives of any of my people, except for The Rug Merchant, and that was in Dubai and only briefly. Even modern-minded, relatively progressive Afghans like the men I work with keep "their" women sequestered. They may object to the depredations of the Taliban, but that doesn't extend to breaking ancient social taboos about women and public life.

So, once we accept that the social structure of this country is not something that can be adjusted by force, the real question becomes two-fold, "Can/should the social structure of this country be changed to a more progressive, modern approach, and if so, what (if anything) can Westerners do to assist that transformation?"

To me, the answer to the first part is fairly obvious. If Afghanistan is ever to be peaceful, prosperous and stable, then some of fundamental underlying principles of Afghan society will have to be cast aside. I'm not saying that will be easy, or even likely, but it is a cold, hard fact. Analysts and pundits like to make long-winded arguments about the Great Game, the Cold War, "strategic depth," etc., all intended to absolve Afghans of responsibility for their plight, but the basic truth is that Afghanistan is the way it is partly because of the atavistic elements present in Afghan culture.

The second part of the question is considerably more difficult. I'm not convinced that there is all that much that Westerners can do to promote the sort of "social adjustment" that I feel is necessary here. People everywhere are notoriously resistant to cultural change, especially when they feel that it is being imposed from outside. That said, I see some small signs of hope among the slowly-emerging Afghan middle class. Thus far, they are concentrated in the major cities, and greatly overshadowed by the oligarchs, warlords, and narco-terrorists who rule much of the countryside. But they do exist, albeit in small numbers, and they almost unanimously desire a society that affords the opportunities that Westerners tend to take for granted. Jobs, security, education, a government that is more protective than predatory, these are the things that this Afghan middle-class desires.

They're not about to give up their cultural identity, nor will they cease being devout Muslims, but they are willing to cast a critical eye on some of the traditions and structures that have given this country over thirty years of war.

And that, I think, is what ISAF can accomplish here: buy the Afghan middle-class the time necessary to make their own changes, and find their own, better way of doing things.

If that's "nation-building" then so be it.

I Love the Smell of Cordite in the Morning

I'm not regular reader of The Guardian, but a friend of mine in DC alerted me to this video report on their website from last Thursday. It covers over a month that the reporter spent embedded with USAF and US Marines in Helmand Province.

Note that a significant portion of the video shows US Marines on a combat patrol, so don't expect polite language. They are Marines, after all; they're not hired for their decorum.

The one flaw is that the reporter, Sean Smith, keeps incorrectly referring to the USAF Pararescue Jumpers (aka PJs) as "Prepared Jumpers." I'm sure they are "prepared" but that's not what the "P" stands for. Hey Sean, perhaps a quick Google search would be in order before you do your next voice-over.

Best line in the video (at the 5:30 mark):

Call over the radio to the Marine patrol leader:
"We don't know if it's your position or not, but there is a possible imminent attack"
Response:
"Hey, you're using a double negative, dickhead. 'Possible' and 'imminent' are two different words. Which is it going to be?"

One can imagine how the distinction between 'possible' and 'imminent' might be important to the guys in the field.

The Dutch Go Home

This has always been an "American" war, with insufficient attention paid to the other nations whose troops fight and die as part of ISAF. The Brits, Germans, French, Italians, Canadians and Poles all have sizeable contingents here, as does Australia, Turkey and Spain. Click here for a full list of ISAF contributing nations.

Granted, not all of them are engaged at the same level of intensity. Most of the Turks are in Kabul, and most of the Italians are stationed in relative calm of the western provinces. In contrast, the Canadians and Brits are stuck in Helmand and Kandahar, two of the worst provinces in the entire country. And before anyone makes jokes about French military prowess, try and survive a week in Kapisa Province, where the Brigade de La Fayette keeps the bad guys mostly on the run.*

*Note the historical allusion in the name. Some people accuse the French of forgetting the long and firm ties of friendship with the US. Not true of the fusiliers in Kapisa.

The Netherlands has long had a small, but vital role here, securing the south-central province of Uruzgan, one of the most underdeveloped places in the country. With insufficient troops, wavering public and government support and last-generation technology, the Dutch have
struggled to pacify the river valleys around Tarin Kowt and implement numerous reconstruction projects.

Now the last of the Dutch are leaving Uruzgan Province, where they have battled against the Taliban for four years. Americans and Australians are already in the process of taking over the FOBs and outposts.

With all due respect to the Dutch soldiers who have fought hard in Uruzgan, perhaps someone should tell the politicians in The Hague that a good guiding principle in wartime is do nothing that causes your enemy to offer their public congratulations.

Gender Politics

Kabul is still on lock-down due to the latest international conference going on at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so we're a bit professionally constrained right now. The usually laughable ANP checkpoints around the city* have been replaced/reinforced by much more serious ANA and NDS guys, under orders to use force if they feel it justified in any way. So, we're spending a lot of time indoors lately.

*Incidentally, I'd like to find out who the genius was at ISAF who decided that the standard ANP checkpoints should be fixed at permanent locations, and then came up with the new slogan. Every ANP checkpoint in Kabul now has a bright blue sign with a dual-language message announcing the "Ring of Steel" and denoting the number of that particular checkpoint. Seriously? That's what the ANP needs? A cheesy slogan? How about more ammunition and a requirement not to shake people down for bribes. The Brits are the "official" mentors to the MoI, but I bet the whole "Ring of Steel" thing is the product of an American mind. Only an American could come up with something so silly.

With the city full of ANA, who are in charge of security after the ANP dropped the ball badly during the last conference, the ANP mostly stand around their blue signs and look sheepish, while the ANA strut around and wave M-16s at anyone who looks at them funny. And the deadly-serious NDS operatives lurk around and scare the shit out of everybody. In short, it's a good time to stay home. The local staff at the villa has been given a couple of days off,* and we're operating on half-staff at company HQ.

*While I don't generally rave about the skills of the locals, the ones we have at the villa are actually quite good. You never miss them until they're gone. After two days of eating meals prepared by South Africans, I'm beginning to appreciate the talents of our local cook. Plus, you'd think grown men would be able to clean up after themselves for a couple of days, but apparently not. Two days without the local cleaners and this place looks like a fraternity house after a particularly taxing weekend (minus the beer cans, of course).

Anyway, being stuck inside with lots of downtime has allowed me to catch up on my reading (and the writing that inevitably follows), so I should have a series of posts up over the next week or so highlighting some recent items.

In the meantime, ponder this bit from the NY Times about the governor of Bamiyan Province. Habiba Sorabi is the only female governor in the entire country and said this to Britain's Channel 4:

Why are they not doing the sacrifice? Always we women should do the sacrifice? Always women during the war and during the conflict, for a long period in Afghanistan, women sacrificed. So this is enough I think.

Needless to say, Governor Sorabi was not invited to Kabul to meet with the foreign dignitaries. Methinks that perhaps SecState Clinton could at least have demanded that Sorabi be present at the conference. Even better, HRC could have made a trip out to Bamiyan by chopper to meet with her personally. That would have sent a powerful message to Karzai and his cronies that shit was going to change, or else.

Unity of Effort

Matt over at Feral Jundi draws attention to yesterday's speech by incoming ISAF commander General David Petraeus (aka Super Dave), in which his main theme was 'unity of effort,' within the ISAF hierarchy, their civilian counterparts and the Afghan government.*

*Good luck with those last two elements. The Afghan government can't even manage unity of effort within itself, much less with ISAF and Western diplomats. And as for the civilian side, Ambassador Eikenberry was quoted as telling General Petraeus that he was "welcome at this (U.S.) Embassy 24/7." Well no shit, Eik. Thanks for the hall pass. Petraeus is the theatre commander in charge of 130,000 coalition troops, 100,000 of those American. Did anyone seriously believe that he might not be "welcome" at his own embassy? Exhibit A for why Eikenberry should spend the rest of his diplomatic career stamping visas in Bangladesh. With a supervisor watching him closely.

Unity of effort is one of the cornerstones of successful COIN theory, the idea being that all elements of the COIN-force have to be working from a common plan with clearly defined goals and joint operations to achieve them. Matt suggests that the 100,000+ contractors currently in Afghanistan should be included under this unity of effort umbrella, and wonders how exactly to make that happen.

Leaving aside the near-certainty that Super Dave and his staff don't spend a lot of time thinking about contractors,* there is a fairly simple way for ISAF to create a more effective working relationship with the contractor community.

*Let's face it: the bigwigs at ISAF don't put a lot of effort into thinking about the contractors working for them. Part of the value of contractors (to ISAF and the U.S. military) is that shit gets done without them having to think about it. Need supplies at that remote COP? Call a contractor. Need some extra perimeter security at a FOB? Call a contractor. Need a suck-truck to empty the septic tanks at Camp Phoenix? Call a contractor. Need anything done that won't be reflected on a promotion board evaluation? Yep, call those contractors and throw some cash at them.

There is a venue for Petraeus to meet personally with movers and shakers of the security community here. The PSCAA (Private Security Companies Association of Afghanistan) is the coordinating and lobbying group for all PSCs interested in working here long-term. (They're supported in their efforts by the Union of Private Security Companies, which is limited to Afghan-owned outfits and whose meetings I've had the unfortunate luck to attend.) Mostly it's a talking-shop and a venue for sharing complaints about the ineptitude of the Afghan government and the Ministry of Interior.* The irregular meetings are not particularly well-attended and usually degenerate into a bitch-fest pretty quickly.

*It's also a handy place to pick up tips on which MoI officials are susceptible to "success-guarantee fees." A wonderful euphemism, don't you think?

However, if General Petraeus (or any senior officer from ISAF) made it known that he would like to address the PSCAA, I'm sure that every country manager from all 52 licensed companies would be there, with most of their operations staff, and all on their best behavior. Spread among those 52 companies, there are hundreds of millions of dollars of contracts supporting ISAF and U.S. Army operations. Even the contracts that aren't written with PSCs directly usually involve a security element at some point.

A couple of hours with General Petraeus would give those country managers a better idea of what ISAF requires by way of support, and hopefully give Super Dave a better appreciation of exactly how integral to his efforts we really are. Even if we disagree on tactics and strategy (which we almost certainly would), there would be value in the discussion.

The ops and intel staffs at ISAF might even benefit, because there'd be a decades of Afghanistan experience among the PSC management in that room. Unlike the ten-months-and-rotate-out planning staff at Camp Phoenix and Bagram, most senior staff for private security companies spend years here, and they learn how to operate in Afghanistan very effectively.

So, Super Dave? Whadda ya' think? Want to come have some chai with your backup?

(Just do me a favor and leave Eik and Holbrooke off the invite list. This isn't a photo op, so they shouldn't mind too much.)

Not Just a Southern Thing Anymore

Until sometime last year, the insurgency here was usually described as a "southern-based" or "Pashtun-based" problem, and that was, by and large, mostly true. But although the Pashtuns are concentrated in the south and east, and although most of the Taliban are Pastun, this fight is no longer limited to Helmand, Kandahar, and the mountainous provinces of the southeast.*

*With no disrespect intended to the ISAF troops who've been hammering and bleeding in the valleys of east central Afghanistan for years. Kunar, Nuristan, Kapisa and Laghman have been shitty for a long time; they just don't get the press that the southern deserts do.

Baghlan, Samangan, Takhar and other northern provinces have been heating up for several months now. The Germans have been having a hard time in Kunduz for at least a year.* Dramatic evidence of that can be found in yesterday's attack on a the compound of a USAID subcontractor in Kunduz.

*Incidentally, the Germans in Kunduz are receiving some reinforcements from the US Army's 10th Mountain Division this summer. We'll soon know if the problems in Kunduz are because of German's inept handling of the population, or a more intractable problem.

The subcontractor, an outfit called DAI, apparently got off fairly lightly, given that half a dozen suicide attackers got in the main gate in a matter of minutes. Apparently, many of the Western staff took refuge on the roof while the security guards and responding police fought it out with the Taliban. That many attackers inside the perimeter is a recipe for disaster and it could have been much worse. I suspect that when the details come out we'll find out that both the private security guards and the ANP performed admirably. Nevertheless, at least one German and one Filipino and possibly a Brit, along with at least one cop, were killed.

Coming on the heels of the attacks on Bagram, KAF and Fob Fenty (at Jalalabad Airfield), it seems that the bad guys have a new plan to hit a variety of targets across the country and aren't too troubled by the fact that they're not usually all that successful. USAID and other developement agencies are considerably softer targets than major ISAF bases, and it won't take much to drive them out of the provinces and back to the more secure compounds in Kabul. Without development assistance, nothing in the provinces gets better for the local residents and this whole enterprise becomes "the island of Kabul in a sea of insurgents."

Like I've said about the Taliban before, scumbags they may be, but they're clever scumbags.

Update: Tim Lynch over at Free Range International has some more information on recent happenings in formerly secure Jalalabad and the activity in the eastern provinces. As always, he has photos which I never seem to have the time to do.

Update #2: Feral Jundi has more details on the Kunduz attack. Apparently, the Brit, the German and the two Afghans who were killed were security guards employed by Edinburgh International. A dark day for a fine outfit, but EI can be proud of their people today. Without their quick reaction and tenacious defense, it could have been a lot worse.

Ummm.......WTF?

I've said recently that the Taliban doesn't gain their intelligence from reading The New York Times or any other Western publication. Most of them can't read in their own language, much less in English, and they have robust networks of local informers and agents that provide them all the intel they need.

However, that said, this strikes me as a particularly muddle-headed approach to journalism. Filkins writes a blog post about how simply meeting with Afghans puts them in danger, and describes the difficulties that a friendly tribal leader undergoes to meet for a short chat. And then he identifies the Afghan by name, even going so far as to say that he lives "about 30 minutes outside of Tarin Kowt" in Uruzgan Province.

Armed with nothing more than that information, even I could probably locate this guy in 24 hours or less just by going to TK and asking around. The Taliban wouldn't even need to do that; they probably recognized the guy right off the bat.*

*The possibility exists that Filkins changed the name or intentionally scrubbed some of the details from the story. If that's the case, he doesn't mention it in the article, which simply opens the door to more randomized retaliations as the bad guys search for everyone who might be the subject.

I usually respect and enjoy Filkins work for the NYT, but this seems to me particularly bone-headed.

WTF, Dex?

The Lone Guerilla Paradox

Over at DefenseTech, Greg Grant has a brief piece on a particular difficulty of COIN operations called The Lone Guerilla Paradox. Basically, as Grant puts it:

In a village, a single insurgent fighter represents a “monopoly of force,” controlling that village even if challenged by an entire battalion of government troops doing continuous battalion sweeps.
The only time the lone guerrilla doesn’t control the village is the few hours when the counterinsurgents sweep through, once they leave, the guerrilla’s monopoly is re-established.

The comments section of the DT post are unsurprisingly alive with a bunch of back-and-forth about current ISAF practice, the pseudo-history of guerilla warfare (complete with bullshit examples) and some partisan hackery. Oh, and a bit of Obama-bashing just for flavor.

All of the discussion about whether or not the U.S. Army (or the Marines) can effectively wage counter-insurgency warfare, or whether they have in the past, misses the basic point. I guess that's to be expected, since Grant misses the salient issue as well.

Certainly, ISAF/Army/Marines has to be better at waging counter-insurgency campaigns. There's been much improvement in the last few years, and there will be more going forward. Also true is the fact that the ANSF needs to be be better at protecting their own people and more effective in the field. Again, they've improved but they still have a long way to go.

But, contrary to what Grant (and his commenters) seem to think, this was will not be won by ISAF, the U.S. Army or Marines. It will not even be won by the ANA and ANP. No conventional security forces will ever have the breadth and depth of coverage to truly eliminate The Lone Guerilla Paradox. They cannot be everywhere all the time.

To return to Grant's quote from above:

The only time the lone guerrilla doesn’t control the village is the few hours when the counterinsurgents sweep through, once they leave, the guerrilla’s monopoly is re-established.

Not necessarily true. This war will be won when we reach a point where, in the absence of a security sweep, that Lone Guerrilla tries to exercise his "monopoly of force" over villagers and they turn on him and beat him to a bloody pile of rags. Because they believe it is in their interests to do so. That is the ultimate goal of counter-insurgency. It's not hunting bad guys with SOF night raids, it's not joint battalion-sized sweep and clear missions, it's not even improved irrigation and some reconstruction funding. It's convincing the general population to pick the right side and act upon that choice. All of those other elements are necessary but insufficient conditions for victory.

The Afghan people are not simply victims in this conflict; they are also the prize and, ultimately, the solution to the Paradox.

Shaping Operations

In advance of any major military operation like the Marine assault on Marjah a few months ago, U.S. forces conduct what they call "shaping operations." That particulary elegant euphemism covers the various activities that take place before the full assault is launched, everything from information operations (i.e. propoganda) to securing important avenues of approach or transit points. The most important element of shaping operations is the movement of small teams of Special Operations troops into the future area of conflict with the mission of killing or capturing Taliban leader or other key personnel. The idea is that the enemy's leadership and operational staff will be significantly eroded by the time the regular forces move in, thereby disrupting the Taliban's ability to resist.

Although the nature of the upcoming Kandahar offensive may have changed somewhat recently, with a seemingly greater emphasis on reconstruction and governance and less on purely 'kinetic' action*, SOF units down south are still engaging in these shaping operations.

*Another wonderful military euphemism. "Kinetic" = "shooting at bad guys"

However, the Taliban aren't stupid and have learned to conduct their own shaping operations in advance of the anticipated attack. In fact, one could argue that the bad guys have been doing such operations for a long time.

Recently, the Taliban have stepped up their campaign of intimidation and assassination in Kandahar, almost certainly in an effort to so degrade the government's ability to govern that any military success will be quickly undercut by political failure. As I said, these guys ain't stupid.

Couple of things jump out at me from the article, one small and petty and the other not so much.

First,

The insurgents have just as busily been trying to undermine that approach, by killing local officials and intimidating others into leaving their posts.
“They read the papers; they know what we are doing,” said a NATO
official here, who spoke on condition of anonymity in line with his government’s policy. “It’s very much game on between the coalition and the Taliban.”

I know it's just a handy little phrase not meant to be taken literally, but these guys don't really "read the papers." Most of them can't read at all. They do know what we're doing, but it ain't coming from the New York Times.

Second,

The youngest victim was a 7-year-old boy, identified only as the grandson of a farmer named Qodos Khan Alokozy, from the village of Heratiano in the Sangin District of Helmand Province. According to Daoud Ahmadi, a spokesman for the governor’s office in Helmand, Taliban insurgents came to his village and dragged the boy from his home at 10:30 in the morning, accusing him of acting as a government informant for telling authorities of their movements. They killed him by hanging him from a tree in the middle of the village, Mr. Ahmadi said. A spokesman for the Taliban, reached by telephone, denied that the incident took place.

Deny it all you want, but I seriously doubt that a 7-year old was hung from a tree because of some land dispute or a criminal enterprise gone wrong. Nope, that was classic Taliban all the way. No doubt the higher-ups in Quetta aren't going to be happy about the bad PR, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the ruthlessness of the Taliban's local operatives.

Was he an informant for ISAF or the ANSF? Quite possibly, but it seems unlikely that one could gain significant actionable intelligence from a 7-year old. More likely they made an example of the kid to send a message to the locals. Talk to the police and no one is safe, not even your children.



"Perfect, genuine, complete, crystalline, pure."

Defenestrations

Big news out of the Presidential Palace a couple of days ago.

President Hamid Karzai forced two of his top three security officials to resign Sunday over their failure to prevent attacks on last week’s peace council in the capital, Afghan and American officials said, creating shock and concern among Western
officials about such serious changes in crucial ministries even as the American war effort here reaches a critical phase.

As a consequence of the attack last week on the "peace jirga" here in Kabul, both the Minister of Interior Hanif Atmar and the chief of the National Directorate of Security Amrullah Saleh have been forced from their posts. Official reports say that after several hours of discussion with President Karzai, during which they were unable to offer "satisfactory" explanations about the failure to stop the attack, both men submitted their resignations which were immediately accepted.*

*That's the official line, but it's more likely that the resignations were a result of both men's refusal to accept Karzai's proposal to release several thousand Taliban prisoners as a gesture of goodwill. MoI troops and the NDS spent the last couple of years rounding these guys up (and suffered a lot of casualties in the process), and now Karzai wants to let them go because he feels like he needs more friends. No wonder they up and quit.

The official line probably understates the acrimony of the "discussions." First, I doubt that there was a lot of actual back-and-forth discussion. Tensions have been running high in the upper ranks of the Karzai administration for some time, and I suspect that Karzai did a lot of shouting while Atmar and Saleh sat there stone-faced. Second, if either of them did get an opportunity to actually present their case, it's likely that questions were raised about the comprimising of the Afghan security apparatus by Karzai's friends and relatives.

Too early to estimate the full fallout from the resignations, but it's safe to say that it won't be good. At precisely the moment when ISAF needs a set credible partners in the ANSF to properly launch the summer offensive, two key ministries have lost their experienced chiefs. Despite some serious flaws with the ANP, Atmar was well respected by both the British and Americans and had a reasonably effective working relationship with his ISAF and U.S. Army counterparts.

By most accounts (including my own estimation), Saleh was one of few truly excellent leaders in the Karzai government. Due to the nature of his job (NDS is basically the secret police, essentially a combination of the CIA and FBI), Saleh kept a lower profile than most in the government, but his organization had become quite effective at rooting out cells of bad guys around the country. It's said that even if they couldn't do anything about it, NDS knew the details on the nefarious dealings of everyone, including those within the government itself.*

*Such knowledge was probably a contributing factor to Saleh's ouster. Even the much-feared NDS was prevented from operating effectively down in Kandahar by the interference of Ahmed Wali Karzai and other scumbags close to the President. Nevertheless, Saleh almost certainly knows where the bodies are buried (literally). If Karzai was smart, he would have kept Saleh in the government just to keep him quiet.

Saleh is an ethnic Tajik, and perhaps more importantly a Panjshiri Tajik and old comrade of Ahmed Shah, the most famous and most effective mujiheddin of the Soviet days. That made him unpopular in a government dominated by Pashtuns, but he was well liked by the various Western intelligence and law enforcement agencies. His relationship with the CIA goes back to the days of the Soviet occupation and it's said that he still maintains close ties with Langley.

Both men have been replaced by their deputies, people closer to the Karzai clan and presumably loyal to Karzai personally. General Munir Mangal, the former Deputy Interior Minister, has been promoted, and Ibrahim Spinzada is the new head of NDS. Both of these appointments are desribed as "temporary" but the Karzai administration is probably not going to expend a lot of effort looking for permanent solutions.

Spinzada is Karzai's brother-in-law and the Mangal clan has been loyal to Karzai for a long time. Looks like the President is using the attack on the jirga to consolidate his control over the security apparatus and remove a couple of more independently-minded rivals.

Not exactly what this country needs heading into the fighting season, and with the Taliban becoming more active every day.

More Bullets vs. Bigger Bullets

The Times of London has a report about how U.S. and British forces are considering a switch away from their current small-caliber assault rifles (the M4 and SA80 respectively) in favor of a return to the larger-caliber weapons that used to be the standard in the '60s and '70s. Specifically, the choice is between the current 5.56mm round (basically a hyped-up .22 cal) and the 7.62mm round (roughly equivalent to .30 cal).

The U.S. Army moved away from the heavier round during Vietnam when it discovered that the 7.62mm M-14 was too heavy for jungle warfare. Perhaps more importantly, emerging doctrine at the time dictated that the primary role of infantry was to find and fix the enemy so that they could be destroyed by airstrikes and indirect fire. Supressive fire became the norm, and soldiers could carry more of the 5.56mm rounds which allowed them to pin the enemy down for longer periods.*

*The Marine Corps briefly resisted this shift away from individual marksmanship, but eventually succumbed to the juggernaut that is the Pentagon's procurement procedures.

This new doctrine affected other NATO nations as well, and the Brits, French and Germans eventually switched over to the lighter NATO-standard round, partly for logistical synchronization and partly because NATO doctrine at the time mirrored U.S. Army combined arms action.*

*Even the Soviets got in on the act, switching from the heavy 7.62mm to the lighter 5.45mm for their new AK-74 (not to be confused with the original AK-47 widely used here in Afghanistan).

Now, according to The Times, both the British and U.S. militaries are considering switching back, apparently due to the fact that they are finding themselves outranged by Taliban fighters with older 7.62mm Kalashnikovs. As the article puts it:

The M4 and the SA80A2 work well in battles at close quarters, such as the narrow streets of Basra in southern Iraq. However, they are less effective in the rural environment of Helmand province, where the Taleban are often positioned more than 300 metres away, making them harder to hit.

Obviously, in a modern counter-insurgency fight, pinning the enemy down with a high volume of supressing fire and then anihilating them with airstrikes is problematic. Even before the new restrictions on close-air support and indirect fire, U.S. and British troops were having a very hard time successfully engaging the enemy without leveling half a village in the process. Now that the restrictions are in place, many engagements consist of a brief firefight in which the Taliban fire a few volleys from long-range and then disappear before ISAF troops can close and destroy them. We take a few casualties and the Talibs melt away. So, the thinking goes, re-equip our guys with longer-range weapons so that they can effectively engage the enemy at 300+ meters without having to rely on tactical air or artillery.

All well and good, but the article propogates a particularly annoying falsehood about Afghans in general and the Taliban in particular, namely that they somehow come out of the womb as master marksmen. This natural talent, wedded to the greater range of their favored AK-47, gives them an important edge over Coaltion forces. This, to put it simply, is bullshit.

First, Afghans can't shoot. Not naturally at birth, and not even after considerable training. Sure there are a few out there (mostly among the bad guys) who have decades of experience and have developed wicked skills with a rifle. But the vast majority of Afghans don't even know how to hold a weapon properly, much less successfully engage a target at 300+ meters. Your average Tennessee redneck has better marksmanship skills than most Taliban. Fortunately, we have a lot of Tennessee rednecks in the U.S. Army.

Second, while the Kalashnikov is well-suited to Afghanistan, being a simple, reliable and rugged weapon, it is not know for it's accuracy. A fresh-out-of-the-factory AK posseses reasonable accuracy, but there are precious few of those around here.* And, nearly every AK in Afghanistan has been rebuilt multiple times, often with hand-tooled parts from gunsmiths in Pakistan. As a result, most AKs are a hodge-podge of different parts and manufacturers. It's not unusual to find an AK with a Russian barrel, Ukrainian receiver, Chinese bolt assembly and a Pakistani firing pin, all scavenged from other weapons. The AKs vaunted interchanability notwithstanding, these weapons are hardly the pinnacle of accuracy and precision.

*A significant percentage of Kalashnikovs in Afghanistan are nearly as old or older than I am, and I was born when Afghanistan still had a king.

So let's leave aside all this hagiography that makes the Taliban seem like ten-foot tall superwarriors. They are tough, resourceful and dedicated, but they are not masters of the art of warfare, nor are the Afghans in general naturally unconquerable warriors born with a talent for fighting. By all means, switch to the 7.62 round and rediscover the virtues of well-trained marksmanship, but remember that it's tactics, not technology, that will win this fight.

After all, we have Tennessee on our side.

Tough Choices

A pair of interesting articles recently by C.J. Chivers of the NY Times. Despite what one thinks in general of the Times, some of their reporters are the best in the field in Afghanistan, including Chivers, Dexter Filkins, Alissa Rubins and Carlotta Gall.

Chivers' latest pieces concern the difficult choices that U.S. Army Medevac crews make on a daily basis when confronted with wounded or injured Afghans. Officially, the U.S. Army position is that non-combat injuries are not their responsibility. As they correctly point out, there simply aren't enough airlift and medical facilities in-country to serve as the first point of treatment for routine injuries. What assets are in place are focused (rightly) on providing the best care they can to wounded soldiers and Marines, and there just isn't enough to go around. No TOC officer wants to be the one to deny a Medevac request to a Marine because the chopper is busy transporting an Afghan with a farming injury.

On the other hand, there are potentially significant benefits to a counter-insurgency operation in treating and assisting the local population with medical emergencies. MEDCAPs (Medical Civil Assistance Programs) are important elements of local COIN operations which build trust and rapport with locals and provide an opportunity to gather valuable information about Afghan villagers.*

*There's even a variant of the MEDCAP called the VETCAP which is, you guessed it, a Veterinarian Civil Assistance Program. Basically, Army vets go out and treat goats with modern medicine. Depressingly, I've heard many more positive reactions from Afghans to the VETCAP program than the MEDCAPs. Apparently, children are cheap but goats are expensive.

Chivers gets to the heart of the problem with two contrasting articles here and here. I noticed that the second article took the form of a blog post rather than an actual piece in the paper, and I can't help but wonder if Chivers is trying to emphasize one aspect of the story over another. Points however for putting up both and thereby illustrating the two sides to the story.

Key passage from the first story:

While the pilots stared at the message board, wondering whether this time the mission for Sadiq would be approved, an officer at the second outpost issued a blunt challenge: would whoever denied the mission, the officer wrote, acknowledge that they knew the boy would die?
The typed answer came back on the screen. The mission was approved

Bravo to the unnamed Marine officer at the outpost who put his higher-up on the spot by insisting on an acknowledgement of the gravity of the situation. Sounds a bit like blackmail, but sometimes it's helpful to remind the FOBBITs that their decisions has consequences.

Campaign Season, 2010

Now that it's June, the campaign season for 2010 is fully upon us. Not that the bad guys waited for June, they actually got started a little earlier with a series of high-profile attacks across the country just to remind everyone that they're still here.*

*Not that anyone had really forgotten.

First up was the 18 May VBIED attack on an ISAF convoy in southern Kabul, which killed two colonels (one Canadian) and two lieutenent colonels and their two drivers. A dozen locals were also killed in the blast. From the location of the attack, it looks like the convoy was on it's way to the COIN Academy at Camp Julien.*

*Here's a tip for the Force Protection guys at ISAF: your olive-green, armored SUVs festooned with antennas aren't fooling anybody, especially when you put three of them in close proximity in rush hour traffic. If you're going high-profile, then use an MRAP; if you want low-profile, try a beat-up Surf or a Land Cruiser. You can't do low-profile in a high-profile vehicle. Choose one or the other.

Next were a pair of complex, coordinated assaults on Bagram Airbase (19 May) and Kandahar Airfield (20 May). Althougth the perimeter was not breached in either attack, the scope and intensity of the action indicates a pretty serious planning effort from Taliban-central. In both cases, there was a combination of small-arms fire, indirect fire (i.e. rockets) and suicide bombers. By all accounts, ISAF security responded well and gave the bad guys a harsh slapdown. Nevertheless, the very fact that the attacks were launched at all bolstered the Taliban's claim to be able to attack whenever and wherever they choose. Tactically, it was a disaster, but in terms of Information Operations it worked out pretty well for the bad guys.

More recently, elements of the Pakistani Taliban pushed the ANP out of the remote Barg-e-Matal district of Nuristan province. Apparently, the ANP and ABP put up a stiff fight, but withdrew when they ran out of ammunition.* An ANA Commando battalion supported by U.S. Army Special Forces is now in the process of taking the valley back.**

*What does it say about the readiness of the ANSF when the ABP, in established border forts, run out of ammunition before the insurgents who just hiked over some of the toughest terrain in the world?
**If we were smart, we'd let the Pakistani Taliban keep the valley and get used to the world-famous hospitality of the Nuristanis. The Pakis would last about two weeks before they went screaming back across the border, dragging their dead and wounded. Nuristanis are sort of like the Afghan equivalent of West Virginian mountain clans- they prefer to be left alone and demonstrate that preference with an impressive talent for bloodshed. It's said that if the Nuristanis don't have any outsiders to fight, they simply occupy their time by fighting each other until someone shows up.

Finally, there's the so-called peace jirga going on currently in Kabul. Couple thousand tribal leaders, mullahs and parliamentarians from around the country (all personally selected by Karzai) are meeting in a big tent to discuss reconciliation and the prospects for peace. Of course, none of the bad guys were invited which sort of undercuts the theme of reconciliation a bit, if you ask me.

Despite the fact that they weren't invited, the Taliban made their presence known anyway by firing a few rockets at the jirga site and briefly taking over the top floors of the nearby Kabul Polytechnic University. A combination of Afghan security forces (there are over 12,000 in the city right now) and U.S. Army helicopter support managed to contain the situation, but once again the Talibs made their point by simply being able to launch the attack in the first place. Tactical or operational success is less important than spreading the strategic message.


The jirge continues until mid-afternoon tomorrow, so things are a bit tense in Kabul right now. Still going out tonight, but we'll keep it close to home and avoid the jittery ANP at the checkpoints.

Reinforcements

First the Finns, and now the Germans.

Finland announced that it's sending an additional 50 soldiers to bolster their already-impressive contingent of 120 troops on the ground.

Not to be outdone by the last country to give the Russians a right good kicking, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany announced that they were sending an additional 500 troops to increase their total in Afghanistan to somewhere around 4800.

Guess we'll need to open some new supply lines to the north to move all that extra beer. Won't need to move any ammunition, since the Germans and the Finns aren't allowed to shoot anybody anyway.